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Notes
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FOREIGN VICTIMS
OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ABROAD BY U.S.
INTELLIGENCE
There need be absolutely no dishonour in trying to ascertain what a
potential or actual opponent is likely to attempt . . .  .  The risk of
disrepute will depend on the extent to which the individual intelli-
gence officer or his organization departs from the norms of moral-
ity in uncovering an opponent’s activities.
— R.V. Jones, former Director of British Intelligence1
I.  THE PROBLEM
The FBI defines economic espionage as “foreign power-
coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. . . . , which in-
volves: (1) the unlawful or clandestine targeting or acquisition of sen-
sitive financial, trade or economic policy information, proprietary
economic information, or critical technologies; or (2) the unlawful or
clandestine targeting or influencing of sensitive economic policy deci-
sions.”2  In 1996 there were approximately 800 economic espionage
matters under investigation by the FBI, directly implicating 23 foreign
powers.3  The International Trade Commission estimated worldwide
losses to U.S. industries at $23.8 billion in 1987 alone, and growing
steadily—“Using the 1982 average loss ratio of $7 billion = 130,000
jobs, this would constitute a loss of about 450,000 U.S. jobs.”4  Fur-
ther, in a report by the American Society for Industrial Security
(ASIS) surveying 325 U.S. corporations, 700 incidents of proprietary
loss were cited in 1995, an average of 32 incidents per month, with a
Copyright  2001 by Michael Mosier.
1. R.V. JONES, REFLECTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE 56 (1989).
2. FBI—Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) Program (visited
Nov. 25, 2000) <http://www.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm>.
3. See Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence United
States Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov’t Info. of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary United States Senate, 104th Cong. 12 (1996) (statement of Louis Freeh, Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation), available at <http://www.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm> [hereinaf-
ter Statement of Louis Freeh].
4. Id.
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total loss claimed for the 700 incidents at $5.1 billion.5  In 1997, ASIS
reported those same losses to have exceeded $300 billion.6  Note also
that any statistical margin of error should be presumed lower than ac-
tual numbers, due to the reluctance of companies to accurately report
losses out of fear of investor backlash.7
The effects of economic espionage are also less tangible in that
they can stunt idea development.  In testimony before the Select
Committee on Intelligence, FBI director Louis Freeh noted in 1996
that the United States spends $249 billion on public and private re-
search and development.8  Small companies who come up with unique
ideas will quickly fold once larger foreign companies take each idea
and mass produce it more cheaply.9  Companies lose incentive to de-
velop technology when they have no way of protecting their creations
and recouping their research costs.
With such significant national effects of economic espionage, na-
tional intelligence agencies have had to confront the issue vigorously.
This entrance into the business arena has led to a vicious cycle of
some national intelligence agencies corruptively spending billions of
dollars each year in their economic espionage efforts, and counterin-
telligence agencies spending billions of dollars trying to thwart those
efforts.10  During 1993 and 1994, the FBI “briefed nearly 250,000 per-
sons at almost 20,000 companies, in addition to briefings at academic
institutions, laboratories, and state and local governments” regarding
economic espionage activities.11  The FBI reported that “its economic
espionage caseload doubled from 400 in 1994 to 800 in 1995.”12  In
1996, the FBI had twenty agents assigned to trade secret theft investi-
gations full time in Silicon Valley.13
5. See id.
6. See Thierry Olivier Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally
Taking Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 93, 98 (1999).
7. See Michael T. Clark, Comment, Economic Espionage: The Role of the United States
Intelligence Community, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 253, 255 (1997).
8. See Statement of Louis Freeh, supra note 3.
9. See, for example, Ellery Systems, Inc., developer of sophisticated communications
software for NASA, who was undercut by a Chinese competitor who stole the trade secrets as
Ellery was commercializing the proprietary information, and Dr. Raymond Damadian, holder
of the first U.S. patent for an MRI device, who now has the smallest of all major companies in
the MRI industry due to economic espionage by foreign competitors.  For these, and other ex-
amples, see Clark, supra note 7, at 272-74.
10. Desmet, supra note 6, at 98.
11. Clark, supra note 7, at 270.
12. Desmet, supra note 6, at 97.
13. See Desmet, supra note 6, at 97 .
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The involvement of intelligence agencies also tends to raise the
stakes of the game and worsen the situation as nations become more
politically implicated.  In February 1995, the French government
publicly requested that five CIA operatives leave the country after
having been caught allegedly stealing economic secrets in Paris.14
This cadre included one agent who allegedly paid approximately 100
dollars each time an aide to the Prime Minister provided information
on French positions on matters being negotiated at GATT trade
talks.15  Reports by France and Italy of industrial espionage by the
United States have even sparked an inquiry in the European Parlia-
ment as to the actions of the CIA and its use of information from the
global espionage system ECHELON.16  Given the dangerously grow-
ing problem of economic espionage and the involvement of national
governments, we must make an affirmative movement toward reduc-
ing this trend.
Many of the papers cited herein already deal with federal crimi-
nal aspects of the issue.  This Note aims to aid in the reduction of
economic espionage by encouraging one of the most effective world
actors, the United States, to clear its reputation so that it can lead
with credibility.  As a major industrial developer, the United States
has an enormous stake in the issue.  Whether it be the arms race,
bankruptcy model law enactment,17 or bribery and other corruption
prohibitions—for which the United States spearheaded combat with
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act18—we have to get ourselves to a
14. See Clark, supra note 7, at 282-83.
15. See id.
16. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about Echelon, nn. 14, 16, 18, 25 & 28, and
accompanying text (visited Aug. 24, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/faq.html> (citing
sources including official reports of the European Parliament).  Note that the NSA is actually
the American intelligence agency behind ECHELON, but the CIA is being implicated for use
of the information derived from ECHELON.
17. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 30th Sess., Report of
UNCITRAL, U.N.Doc A/52/17 (1997), available at <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/texts/
insolven/mlinsolv.htm> (Model law to be enacted in the United States, rather than using an
international treaty, with the reasoning that it would be quicker to take hold all around, for
political reasons, than waiting for a requisite number of nations to ratify a treaty.  Still pending
before Congress.).  See also 11 U.S.C. § 304, though, which has substantial aspects of the model
law already in it, providing many rights for foreign creditors. In fact, the model law was based
largely on U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 304, providing rights to foreign creditors in U.S. bankruptcy
proceedings, subject to some comity discretion.  See Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz, Principles of
Commercial and Bankruptcy Law class lecture, Duke University School of Law (Nov. 30, 2000).
18. “When the U.S. passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it was the only country in
the world with a law that prohibits domestic companies and their agents from bribing foreign
officials.”  Clark, supra note 7, at 261-62.
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moral high ground before we can legitimately and authoritatively en-
treat others to stop.
To this end of accountable legitimacy, this Note will investigate
causes of action for victims of economic espionage abroad by U.S. in-
telligence.  If the reports to the European Parliament are true, and
the CIA has given confidential information about European busi-
nesses to U.S. companies to exploit, is there any redress for the Euro-
pean victims?  The inquiry will naturally include economic espionage
by private actors, since the disclosure of the information to private
U.S. companies will be subsumed in the offense.  Therefore, the more
basic action against private actors, without the necessary complica-
tions of sovereign issues, will be partially dealt with as well.  While
this practical approach will deal with many procedural considerations,
issues will remain regarding proof of causation and other substantive
evidentiary concerns too tied to specific situations to fall within the
scope of this undertaking.  The Note will conclude with an explana-
tion of the cause of action that does seem to exist, though with many
complications.  It will then argue that there should be more effective
and specific recourse against the government for economic espionage
occurring abroad.  For instance, note the anomaly created where a
foreign national could rather effectively sue any other government in
a U.S. court for such quasi-commercial activity under a Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act commercial acts exception,19 but could not sue
the United States itself who provides such a forum to sue everyone
else.
II.  RECOURSE
A. Fora and Substantive Law Options
The first step is to identify laws that address the problem of eco-
nomic espionage.  Unfortunately, international laws and courts are
still too weak in enforcement to provide much help.  It may be possi-
ble to construe economic espionage as a violation of customary law or
of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, as a “threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity . . . of any state, or in any manner inconsistent
19. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States . . . in any case in which the action is based upon a commer-
cial activity . . . that causes a direct effect in the United States.”); see also Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992) (explaining and applying the commercial activities
exception where the Argentinean government was engaged in activity that was not uniquely
sovereign, but rather commercial, in issuing debt bonds for payment in the United States).
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with the purposes of the United Nations” if the spying moves from
passive observation to proactive influencing of events (specifically
commercial) within the nation.20  But again, enforcement would
probably reduce to general political pressure from the victim’s gov-
ernment, which is quite unpredictable.  International agreements may
actually point a plaintiff back to individual countries for recourse,
though.  Under NAFTA, “[m]ember countries must protect trade se-
crets from unauthorized acquisition, disclosure or use.”21
GATT/TRIPS provides the same misappropriation remedies re-
quirements for member countries.22
The next step is to turn to domestic laws of countries, as directed
by NAFTA and GATT/TRIPS.  Not only are there simply too many
countries’ laws to effectively survey here, there are general disadvan-
tages for any plaintiff to sue the United States itself or its citizens in a
foreign court.  As will be discussed below with regard to political
question issues and justiciability,23 the more a plaintiff can keep the
case internal to another country, the less likely it is to be turned into a
political question.  For example, if one sues the CIA in other country,
the State Department would probably intervene with the foreign gov-
ernment.  But if whole suit is in the United States, then the United
States cannot appeal to a foreign government so readily to circumvent
the court.  Instead, it has to deal with its own domestic court, which
should be less vulnerable to attempts to turn an otherwise justiciable
case into a foreign relations event, given predefined tests U.S. courts
have for political issues.24  Similarly, for collection, the more a plaintiff
can keep the whole controversy internal to the country where the as-
sets of the defendant are, the more likely it will get paid because of
fewer judgment enforcement issues.25
20. See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International
Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 276 (1996) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4).
21. R. Mark Halligan, International Protection of Trade Secrets (visited Nov. 14, 2000)
<http://execpc.com/~mhallign/intern.html> (not citing the specific NAFTA provisions).
22. See id. (not citing specific provisions).
23. See discussion infra beginning p. 15.
24. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for discussion of these tests.
25. See, for example, requirements of reciprocity and other factors for enforcing foreign
judgments in Hilton v. Guyot and its progeny.  159 U.S. 113 (1895).  See Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 302 (3d Cir. 1972) (summarizing the criteria for enforcing a
foreign country judgment).  Note also that absent federal statute or a treaty, state law controls
foreign judgment recognition, and states vary on a reciprocity requirement.  See LAWRENCE W.
NEWMAN & DAVID ZASLOWSKY, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 165,
172 (West 1996).
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Then there are the famous/infamous unique procedural advan-
tages of U.S. litigation for a plaintiff.  First, Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure (FRCP) 26 provides for broad discovery, which gives the right
to ask the other party for damaging information, often not granted in
other countries.  Next, under the American Rule, parties pay their
own lawyers, not just that the loser pays both, therefore making it
more realistic for a plaintiff to attempt a suit.  The United States adds
the help of contingent fees, so that the lawyer is only paid if the plain-
tiff wins, again making the suit a safer gamble in complex and risky
litigation, such as suing a sovereign.  There is also a willingness of the
U.S. system to monetize injuries that many other systems would say a
court just cannot put a price on (such as loss of consortium, or mental
injury).  The U.S. court will simply tell a jury to put a price on it.26
There is also a right to jury trial in civil cases, which can lead to very
high awards, including punitive damages, as well some wild cards in
general where a jury may be moved more by emotional issues than a
lone professional judge.  All these distinctively plaintiff-friendly fea-
tures of the American judicial system make it a natural starting point
for our hypothetical plaintiff.
U.S. courts can be approached from either federal or state law.
Federal law applicable to economic espionage includes the Economic
Espionage Act27 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,28 among oth-
ers.29  However, most of these federal laws are aimed at protecting the
United States and its citizens, not foreign private actors.  Conse-
quently, they are criminal statutes, which can only be invoked by
prosecuting U.S. Attorneys, not private actors themselves.  Given the
inherent complications of a foreign national inducing a federal prose-
cutor to bring a case against the United States, as well as the remedies
being criminal penalties rather than civil damages, there is not much
reason to explore these federal laws further.
Instead the United States has generally left private actions in this
sphere to the states to provide recourse, and the most applicable
26. Note that this feature is more a part of substantive tort law than procedure.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996).
28. Pub. L. No. 100-418 (1988).
29. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000), it is unlawful for any federal employee to disclose in-
formation acquired in the course of his employment that relates to “trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or
source of any income, profit, losses, or expenditures of any person, or . . . [to permit] any income
return or copy thereof . . . to be seen.”  Under 26 U.S.C. § 7213(b) (2000) it is unlawful for a
federal employee to disclose the operations “of any manufacturer or producer visited by him in
the discharge of his official duties.”
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cause of action is trade secret protection.  Because it will be impossi-
ble to predict the most favorable state law in advance, the current dis-
cussion will be based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)30 as
a uniform proposed model, which many states have adopted.31  The
UTSA creates a cause of action for both injunctive32 and monetary33
relief for misappropriation of trade secrets.  “Misappropriation” is de-
fined as
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows
or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by im-
proper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent[,] by a person who . . . used im-
proper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret.34
A “trade secret” consists of “information . . . that derives independent
economic value . . . from not being generally known to . . . other per-
sons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”35
“Person” includes a “governmental subdivision or agency, or any
other legal or commercial entity.”36  Given that in the situation dis-
cussed herein the CIA has obtained the commercially useful informa-
tion from a foreign business through espionage, we can reasonably
consider that action “improper means.”  Given the economic harm
the disclosure to a U.S. competitor would cause, we can reasonably
assume that any disclosure of the information would be without the
implied consent of the foreign victim.  Further, under the general
principle that the CIA does not engage in commercial research for
U.S. corporations, and moreover that it is known for foreign espio-
nage, we can assume that any recipient U.S. corporation would have
reason to know the information was “acquired by improper means.”
Therefore, it should, in theory at least, be possible to hold both the
CIA and the recipient U.S. corporation liable for their wrongdoing
under most state trade secret laws.  The question then becomes how
to get to court and bring them with you.
30. Unif. Trade Secrets Act (1985).
31. Forty-one states have enacted statutes modeled after the UTSA.  Two states (AL and
MA) have separate state statutes protecting trade secrets.  Eight states (MI, MO, NJ, NY, PA,
TN, TX, and WY) protect trade secrets under the common law.  See R. Mark Halligan, U.S.
Trade Secret Protection by State (visited Oct. 29, 2000) <www.execpc.com/~mhallign/40state.
html>.
32. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2 (1985).
33. See id. § 3.
34. Id. § 1(2).
35. Id. § 1(4).
36. Id. § 1(3).
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B. Jurisdiction and Justiciability
1. General.  Under the doctrine of comity, foreign nationals
generally have a right to maintain actions that fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the particular state or federal court without any special statu-
tory authority.37  Further, the right to sue and the doctrine of comity
generally apply to “artificial persons,” or corporations, in the same
way as natural persons.38  The question then becomes how to obtain
jurisdiction in the court to take advantage of comity.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)39 grants federal court ju-
risdiction for tort actions against the government if a private party
would have incurred liability under local law for the same actions.40
In fact, the FTCA is the exclusive mode of recovery for tort claims
against the government.41  A plaintiff with a tort action under state
law has a two-year statute of limitations42 from the time when the
plaintiff “has or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the
critical facts of both his injury and its cause” to file an administrative
claim with the appropriate agency.43  Then, once administrative reme-
dies are exhausted and relief still outstanding, a district court is con-
ferred jurisdiction for the plaintiff to proceed with the action within
six months of the denial.44
37. See 3C AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2564 (citing Dunlop & Co. v. Ball, 6 U.S. 180
(1804); Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949); and Nizamuddowlah v.
Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1977)).  Note that “[a]lthough Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, contains some broad language about the relationship of reciprocity to comity, the
case in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to conclusiveness of judgments,
and even then only in limited circumstances. Id., at 170-171. In Direction der Disconto-
Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 747 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.) [sic], Judge Learned
Hand pointed out that the doctrine of reciprocity has apparently been confined to foreign judg-
ments.”  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964).
38. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 461 (citing Lathrop v. Commercial Bank of
Scioto, 38 Ky. 114, 116, 8 Dana 114 (1839)).
39. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346(b) (2000).
40. See Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 359 (1st Cir. 1991); Kramer v. Secretary, U.S.
Dept. of the Army, 623 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
41. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166 (1991).
42. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2675(a) (2000).
43. Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 326 (2d. Cir. 1982).
44. See Kramer v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Army, 623 F. Supp. 505, 509-510 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
MOSIER.DOC 07/12/01  2:36 PM
2001] ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ABROAD BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE 435
Misappropriation of trade secrets is a tort under state law, so we
can begin with the FTCA.45  However, the FTCA specifies that the
violation must “arise” in the United States, not abroad.46  This re-
quirement is troublesome in the situation at hand because trade se-
cret law consists of two violations: taking the secrets and then dis-
closing them to someone for use.  The rub is that the secrets would be
acquired abroad, but might be disclosed domestically in the United
States.  No reported cases have directly considered where trade secret
cases fall for the purpose of establishing FTCA violation locus.  How-
ever, we can look to how courts have resolved the issue of which
state’s laws to use in these bifurcated actions, which should count
heavily in a determination of where the claim arose for FTCA pur-
poses.
Unfortunately, courts are somewhat divided as to the application
of choice of law principles in trade secret cases.  However, most
courts surveyed tend to lean towards counting the principle place of
business of the defendant (here, the United States) as the most sig-
nificant factor rather than the principle place of business of the plain-
tiff (here, abroad), though the latter otherwise often weighs heavily in
conflicts of law analysis of significant relationships.47  Courts use the
defendant’s citizenship in trade secret cases because that is where the
information was used or the benefit obtained, and therefore, where
the wrong was committed.48  Courts have noted that in many other
trade related cases the injury will “normally be felt most severely at
the plaintiff’s headquarters . . . this place may have only a slight rela-
tionship to the defendant’s activities and to the plaintiff’s loss of cus-
tomers or trade. [Also,] the plaintiff may have suffered no pecuniary
loss but the defendant rather may have obtained an unfair profit,”
such as where the defendant gains market advantage even where the
45. See 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §
1115; see also Venango River Corp. v. NIPSCO Industries, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2700, at *10
n.10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1994).
46. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(k) (excepting the provisions of the FTCA from “Any claim
arising in a foreign country.” Id.); see also id. at note 218 (citing Lassiter v. United States Lines,
Inc., 370 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Va. 1973)).
47. That is, often the jurisdiction of the plaintiff has the most significant relationship to the
matter due to the court’s interest in protecting the harmed plaintiff.
48. See, e.g., Venango River Corp. v. NIPSCO Industries, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2700, *9
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1994) (Court also noted Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145
comment (f) (1971) that the principal location of defendant’s conduct is to be given the greatest
weight in trade secret misappropriation cases.).
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plaintiff was not yet doing business.49  Under this analysis, the court
would consider the determinative damage to have occurred in the
United States, where the CIA disclosed and the corporate defendant
received and used the information.  This outcome is justified because
three of the four violating acts occurred in the United States: disclo-
sure, knowing receipt of misappropriated information, and use of that
information–whereas, only one act, the taking, happened abroad.
On the other side, however, there are still courts that stick to the
“most significant relationship” test of §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).50  This analysis is tougher for our
foreign plaintiff because of factors such as the interests of the various
fora in the matter.  The defendant would argue that the domicile of
the foreign plaintiff would want to protect its businesses, and so
would have a significant interest in taking the case.  Indeed, in Victor
Equipment Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., the court stressed the location
of the plaintiff as the place where the injury was sustained. 51  How-
ever, it is possible that this determination was partly driven by the de-
sire to be able to litigate the issue in the United States to protect the
plaintiff, rather than send the case to Mexico where the judicial sys-
tem might have been less responsive to the American plaintiff, and
where awards and enforcement might have been less reliable.
Finally, as some consolation, at least one FTCA case has sug-
gested that where an issue of fact exists with respect to whether the
acts proximately causing the damage occurred both in the United
States and a foreign country, the case must at least survive summary
dismissal.52  Another case denied summary judgment for the CIA de-
fendant for drug experimentation that resulted from funding and su-
pervision of experiments in the United States although the injuries
were suffered by plaintiffs in Canada.53  Since misappropriation in-
cludes either acquisition “or” disclosure,54 one could probably sue
only on the disclosure violation to avoid falling out of the “arising in
the U.S.” requirement.  However, from an evidentiary standpoint, the
plaintiff will most likely be required to deal with the misappropriation
49. BP Chem. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 2000 U.S. App. 299 F.3d 254, 267 (3d
Cir. 2000) (also citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145 comment (f) (1971)).
50. See Victor Equipment Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16291, *16
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
51. See 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16291, at *19.
52. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(k), note 218 (citing Knudsen v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
53. See Orlikow v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1988).
54. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2) (1985).
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that occurred abroad in some fashion in order to show that the defen-
dant should have known the information it received was misappropri-
ated.  The plaintiff’s problems may not end just because it can theo-
retically get into court past summary dismissal.
There also are venue complications with a nonresident alien su-
ing in federal court, even though the action need only trigger state
law.  Case law has suggested that the FTCA is not limited to citizens
of the United States; in fact, unlike actions by foreign nationals in the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, the FTCA does not even have
an explicit requirement of reciprocity.55  However, other cases have
stated that
[s]ince, in the case of individual plaintiffs, actions against the United
States may be brought only in the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides, nonresident aliens who cannot be considered to be residents of
any federal judicial district are unable to sue in the District Courts, and
are limited to bringing actions in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.56
Because the U.S. Claims Court does not have jurisdiction over tort
claims,57 specifically actions under the FTCA,58 this rule would pre-
clude any action by a foreign plaintiff for trade secret misappropria-
tion.  At least one case directly disallowed an FTCA action by a Ca-
nadian corporation, though it had an agent in the state of New York,
because it was not a citizen of the state so as to be within venue of the
“district court within [the] meaning of 28 USCS § 1402(a) for purpose
of maintaining [an] action against [the] United States under 28 USCS
1346.”59
The text of the statute itself provides reason to be skeptical
about the cases denying FTCA jurisdiction for nonresident aliens.
While 28 U.S.C.S. § 1402(b) states that any tort claim against the
United States under the FTCA “may be prosecuted only in the judi-
cial district where the plaintiff resides,” it also provides the option of
“or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.”60  This lat-
ter provision implies that if a plaintiff in our discussion could show, as
55. See 3C AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2581; United States v. South Carolina State
Hwy. Dept., 171 F.2d 893, 899 (4th Cir. 1948).
56. 3C AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2587 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1402(a)(1) and Mala-
jalian v. U.S., 504 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1974)).
57. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1491, comment 11 (citing Singleton v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 156
(1983) and Morales v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 342 (1990)).
58. See Blazavich v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 371, 371(1993).
59. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346, comment 127 (citing Argonaut Navigation Co. v. United States, 142
F. Supp. 489 (D.C.N.Y. 1956)).
60. (emphasis added).
MOSIER.DOC 07/12/01  2:36 PM
438 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:427
discussed above with trade secret occurrence/injury analysis, that the
act occurred in a particular district, venue should be available under
28 U.S.C.S. § 1402(b) for a federal court.  The Supreme Court high-
lighted this opinion in Smith v. United States, in which it pointed out
that Congress did not intend to create “venue gaps, which take away
with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant
with the other.”61  The Court decried the anomaly created by rulings
such as the case of the Canadian corporation above where the lower
court held that the FTCA would create jurisdiction specifically for
foreign nationals for tort claims against the United States, but that
foreign plaintiffs would be denied venue unless they happened to re-
side in the United States.62  Unfortunately for the plaintiff in that case,
the Court used that reasoning to add to its decision to deny plaintiff’s
argument that although the tort arose in Antarctica—which, though
sovereignless, was still considered a foreign nation for the exception
to the FTCA—she should still be able to bring the claim in her home
state of Oregon.
Between the Supreme Court ruling and the statute, one would
think that a foreign corporation would not be absolutely barred for
lack of incorporation in the desired forum state; however, it is impor-
tant to remember that some district courts have given foreign nation-
als some venue trouble.  Further, according to the statute, they will
probably be limited to the venue of the district in which the violation
occurred.  This requirement also precludes forum shopping for the
most favorable state law to use under the FTCA and means that the
plaintiff will be limited to the applicable misappropriation law of the
state of the violation.  Additionally, this limitation could cause per-
sonal jurisdiction issues for the unique tort involved here because
there are two defendants.  While this bifurcation may allow for two
choices of venue, it also means that the chosen venue must have ju-
risdiction over both defendants.  Depending on where the plaintiff
claims the act occurred, if either of the defendants does not have suf-
ficient minimum contacts with that state, the court may lack jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate over that defendant.63  So, the venue and choice of
law problems for the plaintiff are not fully resolved by the statute and
Supreme Court ruling.
61. 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993).
62. See id.
63. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-317 (1945) (explaining personal
jurisdiction requirements).
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In addition to these technicalities for the particular laws in-
volved, we must also deal with general justiciability for the action to
proceed in federal court,64 even though it is based on state law
claims.65  First there is the constitutional “case or controversy” re-
quirement66 that there must be a real controversy between parties
having adverse legal interests,67 not a request for a mere advisory
opinion,68 but an “injury in fact” to the actual plaintiff bringing the
case, caused by the defendant’s actions, and which could be redressed
by the requested relief from the court.69  These requirements should
not be a problem in our discussion action.  We have the actual victim,
not a third party, bringing the case, with a specific economic injury
caused by the misappropriation and disclosure of its trade secrets by
the CIA to a U.S. corporation co-defendant.  The injury already hap-
pened, so the decision is not hypothetical or advisory, and the admin-
istrative remedies failed to rectify the situation, so the case has not
become moot.  One final case or controversy issue remains, however.
The case must not involve a nonjusticiable political question with
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to another
branch of government or “a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving the issue.”70  This requirement
“[e]xcludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve
around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or state legislatures
or to the confines of the executive branch”71—for example, foreign
policy issues such as immigration-related claims.72  First, in our case
there are clear standards for resolving the issue, provided by the
FTCA and state trade secret law.  Second, it is perhaps a policy
choice to collect information, but it is not a valid choice to dissemi-
nate in violation of our own U.S. law.
64. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
65. See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 674 (noting that “the jurisdictional constraints of
Article 3 do not apply to the state courts.”) (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605
(1989) and U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990)).
66. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
67. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361(1989).
68. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
69. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
70. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 674 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997));
see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
71. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 674 (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacian
Soc, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
72. See, e.g., Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23 (2d. Cir. 1996).
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Three documents address the limits of foreign intelligence collec-
tion: Executive Order 12,333,73 the Intelligence Authorization Act
(IAA),74 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).75
While Executive Order 12,333 generally permits the collection and
dissemination of “[i]nformation constituting foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence, including such information concerning corpora-
tions or other commercial organizations,”76 it specifies absolutely that
“[n]othing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in
violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.”77
Therefore, while the CIA may be authorized to collect commercial
data, as it relates to the “areas of national defense and foreign rela-
tions,”78 it would violate trade secret statutes to disseminate the in-
formation to U.S. companies.  The general authorization in § 2.3 of
dissemination is superceded and limited by the preservation of statu-
tory prohibitions in § 2.8, which may still allow some intergovernmen-
tal dissemination, but certainly not to U.S. companies for business
use.  Similarly, the IAA states unequivocally that “authorization of
appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority
for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise
authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”79
FISA goes further into detail in authorizing a court or the Attor-
ney General to approve surveillance only if “solely directed at . . .
communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers
[or their agents] . . . ; or technical intelligence . . . from property or
premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power.”80
An “agent of a foreign power” is “any person other than a United
States person, who . . . acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which
engages in clandestine intelligence activities.”81  All variations of the
definition include some requirement of clandestine or criminal activi-
ties under U.S. statutes, thus ruling out our hypothetical plaintiff,
which is conducting an ordinary business.  FISA defines “foreign
73. 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981).
74. Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88 (1991).
75. 50 U.S.C.S.  1801, et seq. (2000).
76. Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 73, § 2.3.
77. Id. § 2.8.
78. Id. § 2.1 (setting out the purposes of intelligence gathering, with no mention of com-
mercial or economic interests).
79. Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 74, § 402.
80. 50 U.S.C.S.  1802(a) (for Attorney General authorization); see also 50 U.S.C.S. 
1805(a)(3)(B) (for court authorization, with equivalent language).
81. 50 U.S.C.S.  1801(b).
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power” as “a foreign government or any component thereof . . . ; [or]
an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government.”82
So, arguably, we might be able to consider any government business,
like a state-owned bank or utility industry, a foreign power for
authorized surveillance.  However, other sections limit what can be
done with that acquired information, and dissemination of it to U.S.
corporations in violation of trade secret law would be prohibited since
“[n]o information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant
to this title may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees
except for lawful purposes.” 83  All three delineations of foreign sur-
veillance contain overriding provisions specifically prohibiting use of
collected information in violation of U.S. law.
Therefore, the policy choice and value determination that could
be committed to the executive have already been made.  Similarly,
the legislatures have already addressed the issue by making such dis-
semination of commercial secrets illegal under trade secret laws and
setting the general standards for addressing torts by the government
under the FTCA.  Therefore, it is left to the judiciary to rule on ac-
tions outside the prescribed limits of intelligence activities of the ex-
ecutive or the legal limits of activity set by the legislature, unless the
government defendant can invoke other shields to adjudication.
2. Trumping Wildcards.  The initial affirmative defense that
must be considered is that of sovereign immunity, since the CIA is a
government agency and “[a]bsent a congressional waiver, this sover-
eign immunity shields the Federal Government and all its agencies.”84
However, the “FTCA is a broad waiver of federal sovereign immu-
nity, . . . [granting] jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear . . .
tort suits against the United States.”85  Therefore, the complete bar of
sovereign immunity is not a problem.
There are also built-in statutory exceptions to the FTCA, how-
ever, providing subject matter jurisdiction dismissal for “[a]ny claim .
. . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
82. 50 U.S.C.S.  1801(a).
83. 50 U.S.C.S.  1806(a).
84. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1103 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)).
85. Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 359 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674); see
also Kramer v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Army, 623 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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tion involved be abused.”86  Courts have used a two-part test “to de-
termine whether the challenged conduct falls within the exception.”87
First, they look “to the nature of the conduct itself, rather than the
status of the actor,”88 then to “whether the action is a matter of choice
for the acting employee.”89  Further, however, “the discretionary func-
tion exception does not apply if ‘a federal statute, regulation, or pol-
icy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to fol-
low’ or if ‘the acts complained of do not involve the permissible
exercise of policy discretion.’”90  Since the Executive Order 12,333,
IAA, and FISA all prohibit illegal disclosure of information obtained
in surveillance,91 it would seem quite difficult for the CIA defendant
to claim any discretion involved in its decision to act contrary to the
three controlling authorities for its actions.  However, as with any dis-
cretionary test to be applied in courts, “one thing is sure: the Supreme
Court, with all due respect, by its undulations from Dalehite92 to In-
dian Towing93 and Rayonier94 to Varig Airlines95 to Berkowitz96 [sic]
provides anything but a predictable certitude on what is, or is not,
within a discretionary function.”97  Therefore, while the issue looks
favorable for our plaintiff, it is hardly certain.
A similar affirmative defense outside of the FTCA itself is quali-
fied immunity, which shields an administrative officer from liability
for activities that are “within the scope of her office, are in objective
good faith, and do not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person should be aware.”98
However, courts have stated that “[i]f the law was clearly established,
the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably com-
petent public official should know the law governing his conduct.”99
In our hypothetical situation, we have already ruled out the discre-
86. Kelly, 924 F.2d at 359-60 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
87. Id. at 360.
88. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (cited by Kelly at 360).
89. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (cited by Kelly at 360).
90. Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360 (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 546 (1988)).
91. See supra notes 73-83 and surrounding text.
92. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
93. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
94. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
95. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
96. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
97. Kelly, 924 F.2d at 364 (Brown, S.J., concurring in the judgment).
98. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 653 (citing Harlow et al. v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982)).
99. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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tionary option above.  Further, that dismissal notwithstanding, given
that trade secret law is well established in the United States, including
the federal criminal Economic Espionage Act,100 with which intelli-
gence agencies deal more than most people, there should be little
room for a CIA defendant to claim objectively reasonable ignorance
of the state of the law.
If no complete bars keep the defendant out of court, the defen-
dant may still be able to keep significant information out of court un-
der state secrets privilege.  “[M]atters the revelation of which rea-
sonably could be seen as a threat to the military or diplomatic
interests of the nation . . . are absolutely privileged from disclosure in
the courts.”101  There is no balancing of interests; no necessity can
overcome the claim of privilege once “the court is satisfied that the
information poses a reasonable danger to secrets of state.”102  How-
ever, a second inquiry then arises as to
whether the case is to proceed as if the privileged matter had simply
never existed, with the parties bearing the consequent disadvan-
tages (or advantages) of this sudden disappearance, or instead
should proceed under rules that have been changed to accommo-
date the loss of the otherwise relevant evidence.  Such changes
could compensate the party ‘deprived’ of his evidence by, for ex-
ample, altering the burden of persuasion upon particular issues, or
by supplying otherwise lost proofs through the device of presump-
tions or presumptive inferences.103
There is reason to be skeptical, rather than hopeful for such compen-
sation, however.
For instance, in the landmark national security case Halkin v.
Helms, the court declined to alter the parties’ burdens in any way, de-
spite a broad denial of information involving primarily domestic CIA
activities during the Vietnam War era, twenty years prior to the
case.104  Though the plaintiffs only requested information regarding
“the identities of the plaintiffs [themselves] who were subjected to
surveillance,” not CIA operatives or liaison services, the court opined
that it would not force disclosure of any information from which one
could deduce in anyway an embarrassing connection with a foreign
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996).
101. Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)) (emphasis in original).
102. Id. (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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nation or the identity of a past operative.105  The court noted that “the
identity of particular individuals whose communications have been
acquired can be useful information to a sophisticated intelligence
analyst.”106  Therefore it seems unlikely that the privilege will be de-
nied once invoked, given the deference to err on the side of protec-
tion.  Further, it seems accommodation will rarely be granted, given
that even facts only relating to the plaintiff itself can be absolutely
barred without any balancing, since it is possible for an intelligence
expert to deduce information about past U.S. intelligence activities
simply through knowing the names of Vietnam protesters who were
spied on during the 60s.  Indeed, the court was even willing to pre-
sume not necessarily that the CIA had anything to hide, but “that it
wishes to hide from our adversaries the fact that it has nothing to
hide.”107
So the CIA could block evidence that would show it actually did
engage in economic espionage because of the effects on the diplo-
matic relationship with the victim nation.  Additionally, it could claim
general national security privilege in the military interest of the na-
tion because divulging information about the espionage activities of
the CIA needed for the case would give away too much and threaten
national security.  Note that there is little chance of helpful compen-
sation for the deprived party in our situation, because the information
needed from the CIA is fundamental to the action itself, rather than
ancillary proof to drive the point home.  It is quite unlikely that a
court would make presumptive inferences or shift the burden of proof
outright on a basic element of the claim, akin to forcing the defendant
corporation to prove that it did not receive the information from the
CIA, who did not acquire it through economic espionage.  Such a
fundamental shift to guilty until proven innocent seems too much the
antithesis of the American legal process to occur.
C. Remaining Procedural Issues: Joinder and Subpoenas
Given the complications with involving the government as a de-
fendant, we must consider the possibility of proceeding with the suit
against the recipient company defendant alone, and the accompany-
ing complications of such a strategy.  Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide that “[a] person who is subject to service of process and
105. Id. at 991-93 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 993 (quoting itself in Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
107. Id. at 994.
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whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if . . .
in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties.”108  Will it deprive the court of jurisdiction to
add the CIA?  No, it will not affect the diversity jurisdiction because
both defendants are domestic and the plaintiff is foreign.  Also, the
FTCA waives sovereign immunity.  The question is whether the ac-
tions against the CIA will be justiciable, though, based on political
question issues.109  Can complete relief be accorded among those al-
ready parties?  Perhaps adequate relief can be acheived, as discussed
in the following paragraph, but not really complete relief because one
type of defendant will be missing (i.e., the acquirer) under the trade
secret law.  Also, as discussed previously,110 the plaintiff needs to be
able to satisfy personal jurisdiction contact requirements in order to
call the defendants to the court.  So it may not be possible to bring
both defendants to court, based on personal, not subject matter, ju-
risdiction problems.
The rules further stipulate that
[i]f a person  . . . cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent per-
son being thus regarded as indispensable.  The factors to be consid-
ered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered
in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those
already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provi-
sions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment
rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed
for nonjoinder.111
Looking at the factors in order, first, the judgment would probably
not be prejudicial to the CIA because if not joined the CIA will have
to be brought to trial separately and will have its own host of special
defenses as a sovereign.  If anything, the CIA has the information the
plaintiff needs, and will not get without it, so a case without the CIA
will not significantly prejudice the CIA in any way.  Not joining the
CIA will be beneficially prejudicial for the corporate defendant be-
cause the plaintiff will have problems without the CIA’s supply of
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
109. See supra notes 70-72 and surrounding discussion.
110. See supra note 63 and surrounding text.
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
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evidence.  However, the continued adjudication of the case will be
prejudicial against the plaintiff for the same reasons.  Second, the
prejudice to the plaintiff could be lessened by allowing inferences of
evidence in the plaintiff’s favor that are reasonably shown.  Third, the
remedy with just the corporation might be adequate because it would
stop the passing of trade secrets if corporate recipients could be
brought to court, even if the CIA could not.  But the plaintiff would
probably have causal problems bringing a case against a recipient if
could not show the defendant acquired the information inappropri-
ately from the CIA.  So the plaintiff would really need the CIA as a
party to prove the transitive offense, though the plaintiff would need
enough evidence of misappropriation by the CIA to get past summary
dismissal from the beginning either way.  Fourth, there is probably no
adequate remedy for the plaintiff without the action, because there is
not much legal recourse left for the plaintiff to use, especially in U.S.
courts.  So the fourth factor weighs heavily in the plaintiff’s favor.  In
conclusion, the bad news is that the CIA may not be joined; however,
at least the factors weigh in favor of the case proceeding even if the
CIA cannot be joined.
For further illumination of the issue, consider the following case.
A complaint against the Burmese government and its state-owned oil
company was dismissed based on sovereign immunity, but not dis-
missed as to the U.S. corporate defendant, Unocal, for failure to join
an indispensible party under FRCP 19.  Though Unocal argued that
the absence of the state defendants meant that the case could not be
fully and fairly adjudicated, as required under Rule 19, the court re-
fused, maintaining that the plaintiffs could obtain the core relief they
sought of cessation of the corporate enterprise while the human rights
abuses continued, from the remaining corporate defendant.112  In our
case, relief of damages and cessation of use of the trade secrets could
theoretically be obtained simply from the corporate defendants.  The
issue is more that evidence rather than relief itself cannot be obtained
without the CIA.  The actual relief of damages could come from ei-
ther defendant, and in fact the corporate defendant is arguably the
more appropriate compensator because it benefited economically
from use of the trade secrets.
Fortunately, there may be some possibility of evidentiary help
from the CIA even if it is not joined as a defendant because one of
the bars to joinder or jurisdiction.  In a case brought by the father of
112. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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Dodi al Fayed requesting information from the CIA relating to the
death of his son and Princess Diana, the court referenced an appellate
holding that the broad defense of sovereign immunity was not appli-
cable to a federal court subpoena issued to a government agency that
was not a direct party to the lawsuit.113  The court in the Fayed case,
however, ultimately denied the subpoena because it must have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the subpoena in question.114  Mr. Fayed
relied solely upon 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for his action to issue the sub-
poena and that statute only applies to a “person” rather than to an
entity such as a federal agency.115  Without a proper statute conferring
subject matter jurisdiction for the federal court to adjudicate, it was
without authority to issue the subpoena.  The court left it open as to
whether another statute might confer the proper subject matter juris-
diction to issue a subpoena to a government agency, though specifi-
cally hinted that it was not ruling on the matter of whether a particu-
lar officer might be called, as a person, distinct from a federal
agency.116  In fact, though the subpoena was ultimately denied on
other grounds of undue burden and state secrets privilege, another
federal court in the process of its decision at least gave a general indi-
cation, by even getting to those bars, that it considered itself to have
authority to issue the subpoena to the FBI and CIA merely through
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.117
Therefore, while a court can enforce a subpoena against a sovereign
regardless of sovereign immunity, it may not have the jurisdictional
authority to issue such a subpoena.  In further complication, the
Fayed court also cited a split of circuit decisions on the issue of
authority to issue a subpoena to a sovereign entity at all, including
specific officers themselves.118  Therefore, the authority for a court to
issue a subpoena to a sovereign at all remains in question until the
Supreme Court takes up the issue.  Further, this subpoena power is
also subject to state secrets privileges and traditional subpoena limita-
tions such as undue burden.  Therefore, it is unclear how much help
the possibility of a subpoena really would be, and evidentiary issues
remain unsettled for our foreign victim.
113. See In re Application of Mohamed al Fayed, 91 F. Supp. 2d 137, 138 (D.D.C. 2000).
114. See id. at 139.
115. See id. at 140.
116. See id.
117. See Linder v. Calero-Portcarrero, 180 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D.D.C. 1998).
118. See Fayed, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
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III.  CONCLUSION
Some cause of action does in principle exist for foreign nationals
who are victims of economic espionage by U.S. intelligence, through
the FTCA and state trade secret law.  However, so many complica-
tions accompany that cause of action that there is a question whether
any cause of action really exists in practice.  For instance, no court has
directly ruled on how to resolve where exactly the trade secret viola-
tion will be considered “arising” for purposes of the FTCA under the
dual actions of acquisition and disclosure.  Further, the closest analy-
sis of the issue in the context of conflict of laws presents a split of de-
cisions.  The statute and Smith v. United States119 seem to provide
some resolution of the court divide on the issue of whether a foreign
corporation with no residency in any federal district can sue in district
court at all, other than Federal Claims Court.  However, the FTCA
statute limits forum choices for the plaintiff to wherever the court
deems the violation to have occurred—again bringing us back to the
problem of the bifurcated trade secret misappropriation law.  This
limitation on venue choices also leads to personal jurisdiction prob-
lems because there are two defendants, the original acquirer/discloser
and the recipient, and the court must satisfy personal jurisdiction re-
quirements to call either one.  The venue restriction, resulting per-
sonal jurisdiction limitations, and separate sovereign issues of immu-
nity and political question lead to joinder issues where the court may
dismiss the case if an “indispensable” party cannot be properly
joined.  There are discretionary exceptions within the FTCA itself, as
well as omnipresent qualified immunity exceptions for any adminis-
trative agency actions.  Additionally, the broad state secrets privilege
may bar disclosure of important evidence for the plaintiff’s case.  Fi-
nally, if the government cannot be joined, but the case is to proceed,
there is a court split regarding whether the sovereign can be subpoe-
naed for evidence, and even if it can, the subpoena is subject to limi-
tations of state secret privilege and undue burden.  With all these
variables, it is nearly impossible not to be skeptical of any claimed re-
course provided for victims of economic espionage abroad by U.S. in-
telligence.
Given these limitations, then, there are several reasons why a
more reliable and genuine means of redress should be provided for
such victims, not just for their benefit, but for the benefit of the
119. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
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United States.  Note that under the applicable laws,120 even a U.S.
company whose branch or subsidiary abroad was a victim of eco-
nomic espionage by the CIA (presumably not intentionally, but negli-
gently perhaps) may not have a satisfactory cause of action simply be-
cause the violation technically arose abroad, rather than in the United
States.  Our own subsidiaries abroad or indirect partnerships could
unwittingly be victims and they may have no recourse due to many of
the same problems here, such as the “arising abroad” exception and
other sovereign immunity and evidentiary bars.  As writers in this
area of the muddied interaction between private enterprise and intel-
ligence have pointed out, “given the fragmentation of ownership,
management, and employment of most international firms, defining a
strictly American or strictly Canadian firm[, for example,] . . . be-
comes problematical.”121  A former Director of the CIA queried
whether an “American corporation” covers one which is “headquar-
tered in New York, but does most of its manufacturing in Canada . . .
[or] a Canadian corporation that manufactures largely in Kentucky?
Who knows.”122  Further, as U.S. citizens, we want to avoid the likely
conflicts of interest and corruption resulting from U.S. intelligence
possessing inside information that is useful to multiple competing
companies in the United States.  This situation would lead to at least
the temptation for compromises in the integrity of the U.S. intelli-
gence community as companies vie for the information.  We could
end hypocrisy while helping our nationals at the same time simply by
applying our own Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exceptions123 to
ourselves instead of only to every other sovereignty.
This Note is not directed against the United States or CIA.  It is
really in our best interest to be able to push for stronger economic es-
pionage laws everywhere because we are spending billions of dollars
fighting it,124 and we happen to be creating a large percentage of the
120. The same FTCA, needed to sue the government for a tort, and state trade secret law.
121. Robert David Steele, Private Enterprise Intelligence, in INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND
ASSESSMENT 212, 219 (David A. Charters et al. eds., 1996).
122. R. James Woolsey, Remarks on Industrial Espionage at the Foreign Press Center *5
(Mar. 7, 2000) (transcript available at <http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia.htm>).
123. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(2) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States . . . in any case in which the action is based upon a commer-
cial activity . . . [and] that act causes a direct effect in the United States.”); see also Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992) (explaining and applying the commercial
activities exception where the Argentinean government was engaged in activity that was not
uniquely sovereign, but rather commercial, in issuing debt bonds for payment in the United
States).
124. See Desmet, supra note 6, at 98.
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technology falling prey to such espionage.125  If the United States does
not offer a satisfactory cause of action for these crimes, it will be
nearly impossible for our nationals to get similar relief for the same
crimes committed against us abroad, whether unwittingly by our own
intelligence agencies (due to procedural and sovereign issues) or by
foreign intelligence (due to politics of reciprocity and judgment en-
forcement).126  If we are not doing anything wrong, we have nothing to
worry about in opening ourselves to accountability.  Meanwhile,
France and Israel have been notorious offenders in this area,127 so it
would be beneficial to have a cause of action against them in their
own courts, where seizure of assets and judgment enforcement may
be more practicable, rather than trying to bring over a foreign judg-
ment from FISA exceptions used in the United States.  Former CIA
Director, R. James Woolsey, bluntly made the point about our
greater need to protect ourselves from others than worrying about
our own liability: “True, in a handful of areas European technology
surpasses American, but, to say this as gently as I can, the number of
such areas is very, very, very small.  Most European technology just
isn’t worth our stealing.”128  Meanwhile, we risk chilling creative out-
put in Woolsey’s grand United States for lack of idea protection.  As
leading world developers, we really do have more to lose than to gain
by lax economic espionage laws, even if we have to get down from
our raft of immunity to pull others into the pool.
Michael Mosier
125. See Statement of Louis Freeh, supra note 3.
126. See, e.g., comments in note 25 regarding requirements of judgment enforcement.
127. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about Echelon, n. 31 and accompanying
text (visited Aug. 24, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/faq.html> (citing official report
of the European Parliament: Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of
Economic Information, An appraisal of technologies for political control, PE 168.184/Part 4/4,
Ch.1, para.7 (Apr. 1999)); Brandon J. Witkow, Comment, A New “Spook” Immunity: How the
CIA and American Business are Shielded from Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade Se-
crets, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 451, 462 (2000).
128. R. James Woolsey, Why We Spy on Our Allies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2000, available at
<http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm>.
